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Abstract		
Open immigration policy changes are often cast as a feature of democracy and restrictive immigration 
policy changes as a feature of autocracy. This paper shows that the relationship between political 
regime type and immigration policy change is not as clear cut. Empirical evidence suggests that the 
substance of immigration policy change — in terms of openness or restrictiveness — does not 
significantly differ between democracies and autocracies. However, political regimes shape 
immigration policy dynamics, with autocracies having more leeway than democracies to open (or 
restrict) immigration according to their economic, geopolitical, or domestic priorities. Autocracies can 
more easily enact open immigration policy reforms compared to democracies if they wish to do so, a 
dynamic I call the ‘illiberal paradox’ and illustrate with empirical examples from across the globe. I 
also outline the limits of the autocratic openings on immigration, related to policy implementation, 
sudden policy backlashes and migrants’ integration rights. To move towards more global immigration 
policy theories, this paper suggests combining analyses that identify ideal types of democratic or 
autocratic immigration policymaking with studies of the nuances of real-life political practices. This 
would allow scholars to conceptualise immigration policy dynamics across the entire democracy-
autocracy spectrum, for instance by capturing authoritarian practices within formal democracies and 
democratic practices within formal autocracies. 
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Immigration policies have received growing attention from academia over the past decades. Today, 
the literature offers various theories of immigration policymaking. However, their applicability is 
almost always restricted — explicitly or implicitly — to so-called Western liberal democracies 
(Boswell, 2007; Castles, 2004a; Freeman, 1995, 2006; Hampshire, 2013; Hollifield, 1992; Joppke, 
1998a, 1998b; Meyers, 2000; Sassen, 1996).1 Among the most prominent and widely cited theories 
features the ‘liberal paradox’. Hollifield (1992) pioneered the term to explain why, despite growing 
politicization of immigration and popular calls for restrictions, open immigration policies have 
prevailed across ‘Western liberal-democracies’. He argued that liberal democracies are confronted 
with contradictory drivers when elaborating their immigration policies. On the one hand, the dominant 
ideology of economic liberalism pushes (labour) markets to globalise and immigration regimes to 
open up. On the other hand, the political logic of democratic nation-states is dominated by electoral 
objectives and national identity concerns and therefore seeks to limit immigration.  
Complementing this argument, other researchers have pointed to the fact that immigration 
policies in liberal democracies have a built-in tendency to liberalise because powerful employer 
lobbies succeed in pushing governments to open immigration (Freeman, 1995). Also, legal 
constraints, such as constitutional or international norms and their enforcement through national 
courts, limit the extent to which liberal democracies can restrict immigration (Joppke, 1998a; Sassen, 
1996). As a result of these dynamics, discourses about immigration, which respond mainly to national 
audiences, tend to be more restrictive than policies in practice — policies that also have to integrate 
the demands of markets and international norms. Immigration policy is therefore often characterised 
by a ‘discursive gap’ (Boswell, 2007; Joppke, 1998a).  
By linking the liberal-democratic character of Western states to the open nature of their 
immigration policies, the literature has suggested a ‘regime effect’: Despite restrictive discourses, 
democracy is said to align with de-facto open immigration policies. The reverse assumption, namely 
that autocracies go together with restrictive immigration policies, has received less academic 
attention. Yet it seems intuitive: If autocratic state curtail their citizens’ socio-political rights, why 
should they grant them to foreigners? For a long time, studies that examine immigration policymaking 
in autocracies have been lacking or have remained apart from theoretical discussions. This is partly 
because autocratic policymaking is assumed to be centralized and devoid of negotiations dynamics — 
and thus of minor interest to scientific investigation — and partly because scholars have presumed 
that apart from the wealthy Oil monarchies of the Gulf, few people migrate to autocracies, as these are 
usually places people leave.2 Therefore, the ‘regime effect’ — linking democracy and open 
immigration policies — has largely remained at the level of an educated guess.  
This paper explores the existence of a ‘regime effect’ in immigration policy and in particular 
the ways in which autocracy shapes states’ immigration policy dynamics. In doing so, it draws on the 
                                                      
1 The term ‘Western liberal democracy’ is rarely (if ever) explicitly defined in the migration literature, which is 
highly problematic. In fact, authors use the term as a shortcut to set the boundary condition of their theory, 
applicable to an ‘exclusive club’ of ‘rich, developed’ countries (for a more thorough literature review and 
critique, see: Natter 2018). 
2 The literature contains a theoretically more consolidated body of research on the drivers of emigration policies 
and politics in autocracies (Brand 2002; de Haas and Vezzoli 2011; FitzGerald 2006; Gamlen 2008; Glasius 
2017a; Miller and Peters 2018; Vezzoli 2015). 
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theoretical reflections that have emerged from my research on Morocco and Tunisia, as well as the 
recently emerging quantitative and qualitative insights on this question (see for instance: Breunig, 
Cao, & Luedtke, 2012; FitzGerald & Cook-Martín, 2014; Klotz, 2012; Natter, 2014; Norman, 2018; 
Paoletti, 2011; Russell, 1989; Shin, 2017; Thiollet, 2016; Tsourapas, 2017). 
1.1 Defining key concepts 
For this exercise, conceptual clarity is crucial. First, what is immigration policy? This paper adopts a 
broad definition of immigration policy, covering both issues of immigrant admission (such as border 
controls; entry requirements for labour and family migrants, as well as refugees and asylum seekers; 
and deportation policies), and immigrant rights (such as access to permanent residence permits; 
employment, social and welfare benefits; voting rights and the right to hold public office; and 
ultimately citizenship). It encompasses both policy discourses and enacted policy changes, but it does 
not systematically touch upon issues of policy implementation, which raise a different set of questions 
linked to bureaucratic efficiency, corruption, and the financial and human resources available to 
government agencies (de Haas & Vezzoli, 2011: 28).3  
Second, immigration policy analyses can focus on various aspects that might yield very 
different conclusions. This paper looks at immigration policy change. It explores both the substance 
of immigration policy reforms in terms of introducing a change towards more or less restrictiveness, 
as well as the dynamics underlying immigration policy change, namely how state authorities deal with 
various international and domestic forces in their immigration policymaking. Importantly, my analysis 
therefore offers comparative insights on immigration policy change in autocracies and democracies, 
but not on a state’s absolute levels of openness or closure towards immigration.  
Finally, what are democracies and autocracies? Exploring the vast literature on this topic (see 
for instance: Brooker, 2014; Diamond, 2002; Glasius, 2015; Linz, 2000 [1975]) is beyond my scope. 
For the purpose of this paper, I adopt a two-step approach. First, I make use of the political regime 
ideal types of democracy and autocracy used in the widely referenced Polity IV project. Democracy is 
defined as a combination of three elements: “One is the presence of institutions and procedures 
through which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders. 
Second is the existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive. 
Third is the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political 
participation” (Marshall, Gurr, & Jaggers, 2016: 14). In opposition, “autocracies sharply restrict or 
suppress competitive political participation. Their chief executives are chosen in a regularized process 
of selection within the political elite, and once in office they exercise power with few institutional 
constraints” (Marshall et al., 2016: 15). Hybrid regimes are seen as an intermediate category.4 
                                                      
3 For a conceptualization of the difference between policy discourses, policies on paper and policy 
implementation, see: Czaika and de Haas 2013. 
4 “For example, a polity is coded here to reflect a weakening of executive authority vis-à-vis the legislative 
and/or judicial branches or a strengthening of executive authority vis-à-vis these branches of government. This 
code may also reflect the decision on the part of the legislature to grant the chief executive “emergency powers” 
in times of a national crisis or, in a hybrid regime – which grants significant executive powers to both a 
president and prime minister – when the head of state and the head of government are from the same party” 
(Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers 2016: 66). 
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In a second step that considers the limits of binary regime ideal-types, I integrate political 
practices into the discussion on immigration policymaking. As Glasius (2018b) writes: “Practices are 
much more than the action or behaviour of an individual, but much less than a state structure. A focus 
on practices allows a shift away from designating only ‘regimes’ as authoritarian, recognizing that in 
contemporary politics, governance arrangements can be more fluid”. Indeed, combining theories of 
immigration policymaking (within political system ideal-types) and a political practice approach 
allows to identify authoritarian practices5 within formally democratic systems and democratic 
practices within formally autocratic systems. As I hope to show, this perspective provides the 
foundation for a more global theorization of immigration policymaking beyond the simplistic 
democracy/autocracy dichotomy. 
1.2 Outlining the argument  
This paper first of all shows that the link between political regimes and immigration policy is not as 
clear-cut as expected: First of all, quantitative empirical evidence on immigration policies shows a 
high level of continuity; policy changes are an exception, regardless of regime type. Second, those 
immigration reforms that are enacted generally open entry and post-entry rights for migrants, while 
tightening border controls and return policies - regardless of whether decision-makers are autocrats or 
democratically elected. Contrary to widespread beliefs, there seems to be no a priori substantive 
difference across political regimes in terms of the change in restrictiveness introduced by immigration 
policy reforms. In other words, democracies do not enact overall more or less restrictive immigration 
reforms compared to autocracies. Instead, immigration policy changes seem rather driven by a state’s 
broader economic, geopolitical or ideological interests.  
Thirdly, however, qualitative empirical evidence suggests a ‘regime effect’ when it comes to 
the dynamics underlying immigration policy change, i.e., the domestic and international influences 
states have to reconcile when elaborating reforms. I argue that autocracies have greater leeway in 
devising their immigration policies and a broader range of policy options at their disposal, whether it 
is towards more openness or more closure. Indeed, autocratic regimes, while bound by the same 
international forces of economic and rights-based liberalism as democracies, are freer from nation-
state logics and potential popular anti-immigration sentiments. Paradoxically, autocratic regimes can 
enact open immigration reforms more easily than democracies if this suits their economic, foreign 
policy, or domestic political priorities. To explain why and under what circumstances autocracies can 
have greater leeway to enact liberal policy reforms, I introduces the ‘illiberal paradox’ hypothesis as a 
complement to the liberal paradox (Hollifield, 1992).  
To conclude, I seek to stimulate reflection on how to move towards a more global 
theorization of immigration policy dynamics. One way forward is to combine (1) existing conceptual 
work that identifies ideal types of democratic or autocratic immigration policymaking with (2) 
empirical analyses exploring the nuances of real-life political practices. This would allow scholars to 
capture authoritarian practices within formal democracies and democratic practices within formal 
autocracies. Within such a perspective, the dynamics that both the liberal paradox and the illiberal 
paradox theorize would provide useful theoretical frameworks for understanding immigration 
policymaking in countries across the democracy-autocracy continuum. 
                                                      
5 Glasius (2018: 527) defines authoritarian practices as “a pattern of actions, embedded in an organised context, 
sabotaging accountability to people (‘the forum’) over whom a political actor exerts control, or their 
representatives, by disabling their access to information and/or disabling their voice”.  
 




Existing datasets provide first quantitative insights into the relationship between political regimes and 
immigration policy change. In the following analysis, immigration policy change is captured in two 
ways. First, I examine the declared immigration policy objectives of a country’s government 
according to the UN World Population Policies Database.6 Second, I review the migration policy 
changes enacted by a government in a particular year, as recorded in the DEMIG POLICY database.7 
As discussions around the ‘discursive gap’ show, declared policy intentions often differ from enacted 
policy changes. Therefore it is important to look at both facets of a country’s immigration policy. To 
match these immigration policy changes to a country’s political system, countries were categorized as 
‘democracy’, ‘autocracy’, or ‘hybrid regime’ according to the global Polity IV dataset.8  
2.1 Declared immigration policy objectives 
With its global coverage, the UN World Population Policies Database offers unprecedented insights 
into governmental positions on immigration across political systems and world regions, even if it only 
captures government positions on legal immigration (and not irregular migration or integration 
issues). Descriptive analyses yield a surprising picture of global immigration policy objectives. 
Against assumptions of growing restrictiveness, the data suggests that, since the mid-1970s, on 
average 68% of governments worldwide sought to maintain their levels of legal immigration.9 
Another 24% declared their ambition to reduce immigration and 8% to increase immigration (see 
Figure 1). Thus a high level of continuity seems to characterise immigration policy.  
                                                      
6 The UN World Population Policy dataset provides insights into 197 governments’ self-declared policies on 
immigration over the 1976-2015 period. It asks governments to indicate whether they wish to lower, maintain or 
raise legal immigration. The database is compiled using various governmental and non-governmental sources, 
and provides a general overview of government views and policies on migration. It comprises 11 rounds so far 
between 1976 and 2015 (for more details, see: https://esa.un.org/poppolicy/about_database.aspx). 
7 DEMIG POLICY tracks 6,500 changes in migration policy restrictiveness of 45 countries over the 1900-2013 
period. Migration policies are defined as “rules (i.e., laws, regulations, and measures) that national states define 
and [enact] with the objective of affecting the volume, origin, direction, and internal composition of […] 
migration flows” (Czaika and de Haas 2013: 489). Policy changes are coded according to policy area (border 
controls, entry and stay, integration, and exit), as well as the migrant groups targeted (for instance: low-skilled 
workers, high-skilled workers, family members, international students, irregular migrants, refugee and asylum 
seekers, or members of the diaspora) The 45 countries included in DEMIG POLICY are: Argentina, Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Czech Republic, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, German Democratic Republic, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, 
Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, 
United States of America, and Yugoslavia. All 45 countries are also covered by the UN World Population 
Policies Database. For more details, see: de Haas, Natter and Vezzoli (2015). 
8 Polity IV classifies countries in terms of degrees of democracy and autocracy on a -10 to 10 scale. It provides 
global coverage of countries’ political systems since 1800. A democracy is defined as scoring 6 or above, an 
autocracy as scoring -6 or less, and a hybrid regime as scoring between -5 and 5 on the Polity IV scale (for more 
details, see: http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2016.pdf). 
9 Note that interpreting the category of ‘maintaining’ immigration is problematic, as ‘maintaining’ can apply to 
both immigration-lowering and immigration-raising policies. 
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Figure 1: Declared policy on immigration, global average over the 1976-2015 period
 
Figure 2: Declared policy on immigration over the 1976-2015 period, in % of countries 
 
 The analysis over time shows two main trends (see Figure 2). First, the share of countries 
seeking to increase immigration grew over time, from under 5% in the 1980s to over 13% in 2015. 
This could be partly due to the development of policies in Europe and North America seeking to 
attract skilled migrants for particular economic sectors (Czaika, 2018). But it might also reflect the 
industrialization and transformation of Asian economies and the accompanying transition from 
emigration to immigration country, such as in China, Thailand and South Korea. Second, the number 
of governments seeking to lower immigration peaked in the mid-1990s. This might be partly due to 
the end of the Cold War and its associated geopolitical shifts. In particular, the rapid switch of many 
countries around the world from autocracies to democracies (see Polity IV dataset) and the related 
‘exit revolution’ (Zolberg, 2007), namely the dismantling of emigration restrictions, boosted 
emigration from those countries. Larger flows may have led to a backlash in destination countries, 
mirrored in the declared policy objectives. 
Distinguishing between regime types does not fundamentally alter these pattern (see Figure 
3): Overall, governments classified as democracies, autocracies, or hybrid regimes by the Polity IV 
dataset do not differ much in their declared intentions to make immigration policies more or less 
restrictive. About two-thirds of governments — regardless of regime type — intended to maintain 
their policies, around 25% to reduce immigration and less than 10% to raise legal immigration levels.  
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Figure 3: Declared policy on immigration, 1976-2015, by regime type 
 
Development levels10 seem to be a stronger predictor of declared immigration policy 
objectives. Highly developed countries seek to raise immigration more frequently than lesser or least 
developed countries: 14% compared to 9% and 1%, respectively (see Figure 4). Strengthening this 
finding are regional analyses showing that in highly developed Europe and North America, 
governments have indicated the greatest willingness to increase immigration, in 13% and 18% of the 
country-year cases, respectively (see Figure 5). The data confirms that advanced economies are 
structurally dependent on immigration to function and grow (Piore, 1979). More generally, these 
findings suggest that immigration policymaking cannot be analysed only through the lens of political 
regimes. Economic openness and development levels must also be considered.  
Figure 4: Declared policy on immigration, 1976-2015, by development level  
 
                                                      
10 Countries are categorised as ‘more developed’, ‘less developed’, and ‘least developed’ by the UN according 
to a set of development indicators, mainly per capita gross national income (GNI), but also a human assets index 
(based on indicators of nutrition, health, education and adult literacy) and an economic vulnerability index 
(based on (in)stability of agricultural production, exports of goods and services, or the percentage of population 
displaced by natural disasters). Half of the countries covered by the dataset are categorised as ‘less developed’, 
25% as ‘more developed’, and 25% as ‘least developed’ (for more information, see: 
https://esa.un.org/poppolicy/ExplanatoryNotes.aspx and 
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/wesp/wesp_current/2014wesp_country_classification.pdf). 
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Figure 5: Declared policy on immigration, 1976-2015, by world region 
 
2.2 Enacted migration policy changes 
As we have seen, declared immigration policy objectives over the past four decades are characterised 
by a high level of continuity, with two-thirds of governments intending to maintain immigration 
levels. DEMIG POLICY, which focuses on enacted policy changes, allows us to zoom into the (rather 
rare) instances in which governments have taken measures to open up or restrict their immigration 
policies. Taking all migration policy changes recorded since 1900 in the 45 countries covered by the 
dataset together, 53% enacted permissive changes, 37% made restrictive changes, and 10% 
experienced no change in restrictiveness (see Figure 6).11 
Figure 6: Restrictiveness of migration policy changes since 1900 
 
Over time, three different periods can be discerned: (i) From 1900 until the end of WWII, 
restrictive changes prevailed; (ii) from the end of the 1940s until the end of the 1980s, permissive 
migration policy changes dominated; (iii) and from the 1990s onward, the proportion of more and less 
restrictive changes nearly converged, although permissive changes continued to outnumber restrictive 
ones (see Figure 7). As detailed elsewhere (see: de Haas, Natter, & Vezzoli, 2016), these patterns 
reject the widespread assumption of growing migration policy restrictiveness. 
                                                      
11 The DEMIG POLICY dataset covers both democracies and autocracies: Over the 1900-2014 period, 17% of 
the recorded migration policy changes (roughly 1,000) have been enacted by autocratic or hybrid regimes, the 
remaining 83% (roughly 4,500) by democratic regimes.  
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Figure 7: Migration policy restrictiveness over time, in % of changes 
 
As with declared policy objectives, the disaggregated analysis of enacted policy changes 
along regime types does not change these results substantially. The proportions of more and less 
restrictive changes enacted by democracies, hybrid regimes, and autocracies do not significantly 
differ, with about 50% of immigration policy reforms across all regime types enacting less restrictive 
changes (see Figure 8). This finding seems to indicate that a country’s openness (or restrictiveness) 
towards migration is not fundamentally linked to the political system in place, but driven by other 
factors that could include the economy, foreign policy priorities, or state ideologies. It also 
complements a similar finding on the drivers of immigration policy in 21 liberal democracies showing 
that political party ideologies do not significantly affect the restrictiveness of enacted immigration 
policy compared to factors such as economic growth, demographics, or welfare systems (de Haas & 
Natter, 2015).  
Figure 8: Restrictiveness of migration policy changes since 1900, by regime type 
 
DEMIG POLICY also allows to disaggregate the analysis along four different migration 
policy areas, namely border controls, entry and stay rules, integration, and exit measures. Results 
show that while proportions of more and less restrictive changes vary significantly depending on the 
policy area, they are roughly comparable across regime types. For instance, policy changes targeting 
border controls are overwhelmingly restrictive (Figure 9-a) and integration measures are 
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overwhelmingly permissive (Figure 9-c), but these results hold for democratic, autocratic, and hybrid 
regimes to a similar extent. The results for integration measures are particularly striking, as migrants’ 
post-entry rights are expected to be weaker in autocracies where even citizens’ socio-political rights 
are often curtailed. More quantitative and qualitative research is necessary to investigate this finding 
in-depth.12 
Legal entry and stay policies are slightly more permissive on average in democracies than in 
autocracies and hybrid regimes (see Figure 9-b). This is partly explained by development levels: the 
democracies included in DEMIG POLICY are generally wealthier than the autocracies and thus more 
structurally dependent on immigration. On the contrary, exit and return policies are, on average, more 
permissive in autocracies (see Figure 9-d). Such permissiveness might be surprising, but is ultimately 
linked to the fact that the autocracies included in DEMIG POLICY are mainly emigration countries,13 
hence their exit policies target mainly their own emigrants. In contrast, the exit policies of 
democracies capture mainly return policies targeting the foreign born. These results suggest that the 
drivers of border control, entry and stay, integration, and exit policies are intrinsic to their respective 
areas and not per se linked to the regime type in place.  





                                                      
12 One possible explanation could be that DEMIG POLICY also captures countries’ diaspora policies. A 
separate analysis of the policies devised to integrate immigrants and emigrants would provide more clarity on 
this point.  
13 For instance, Gulf countries are not included.    
 




Contrary to assumptions that a ‘regime effect’ links open immigration policy changes to democracy, 
the empirical evidence presented so far suggests no a priori difference in the substance of immigration 
policy change (i.e., openness or restrictiveness) across political regimes. In other words, democracies 
do not seem to enact overall more or less restrictive immigration policy changes compared to 
autocracies. However, as the remainder of this paper will show, political regimes do shape 
immigration policy dynamics in terms of the domestic and international influences states must 
reconcile and the resulting leeway states have in devising their immigration policies. As a result, 
autocracies usually have a wider range of policy options at their disposal than democracies, be it to 
open or restrict immigration.  
3.1 The liberal paradox  
The ‘liberal paradox’, which Hollifield coined in 1992 to capture the contradictory drivers confronting 
liberal democracies when elaborating their immigration policies, is among the most prominent 
theories on immigration policymaking. He writes, “States are trapped in a ‘liberal paradox’. Since the 
end of World War II, international economic forces (trade, investment, and migration) have been 
pushing states towards greater openness, while the international state system and powerful (domestic) 
political forces push states towards greater closure. […] Hence the liberal paradox: the economic logic 
of liberalism is one of openness, but the political and legal logic is one of closure” (Hollifield, 2004: 
886-7).  
Hampshire (2013) further developed Hollifield’s liberal paradox by arguing that four features 
inherent to liberal-democratic statehood create conflicting demands on governments’ immigration 
policy: “Representative democracy, constitutionalism, capitalism and nationhood each generate 
distinct imperatives for government action on immigration. And none of these imperatives can be 
ignored because each is rooted in the legitimation of the liberal state” (Hampshire, 2013: 3).14 On the 
one hand, constitutionalism, a political system built on checks and balances and in which courts and 
laws guarantee human rights; and advanced capitalism, with its structural dependence on migrant 
labour, pull decision makers towards openness. On the other hand, representative democracy, 
structured around public opinion, political parties, interests groups, and mass media; and nationhood, 
key for national identity formation and social cohesion, pull decision makers towards restrictive 
immigration policy changes. The fact that nationhood and capitalism are unrelated to the liberal 
character of a state and might be equally relevant to autocracies is not further discussed.  
Over the years, Hollifield’s liberal paradox has been complemented by other scholars 
(Boswell, 2007; Freeman, 1995; Joppke, 1998a; Sassen, 1996) who point to international and 
domestic political dynamics, such as the role of business lobbies or legal actors, to explain why liberal 
democracies tend to enact immigration policies that are more liberal than public opinion supports.15 
                                                      
14 Hampshire explicitly limits his argument to ‘rich liberal democracies’, but does not define this term. Instead, 
he takes it as a shorthand for “the countries of Europe, North America and Oceania (Australia and New 
Zealand)” (Hampshire, 2013: 2). 
15 For a thorough review of how the ‘liberal paradox’ has been conceptualised differently throughout the 
migration literature, see Acosta Arcarazo and Freier (2015) and Bonjour (2011). Other authors, such as 
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Overall, literature on the liberal paradox suggests that immigration policy dynamics in liberal 
democracies are subject to two contradictory logics: (1) the dominant ideology of liberalism, which 
pushes (labour) markets to globalise and states to enshrine international human rights into national 
legislation, providing the ground for open immigration policy changes; (2) the politics of democratic 
nation-states, which electoral objectives and national identity claims dominate, encouraging closure 
towards immigration. In this conceptualization, pro-immigration reforms are attributed to the lobbying 
efforts of employers and business interests, or to the limits imposed on national policymaking by 
human rights norms and courts; while anti-immigration reforms are attributed to the democratic 
dynamics of elections, party politics, and public opinion. Because of these dynamics, immigration 
policy is often characterised by a ‘discursive gap’, whereby discourses about immigration that mainly 
target national audiences are often more restrictive than actual policies that need to integrate the 
demands of markets and international norms. Figure 10 illustrates the dynamics captured by the 
liberal paradox argument. 








The policymaking dynamic the liberal paradox theorizes operates at the macro level of 
political economy. The nuances and complexities of real-life political practices, however, reveal some 
of its inherent limits. Studies have pointed at alternative drivers for open immigration policy changes 
that are unrelated to the democratic character of the state, such as liberal dispositions among the 
population or overall economic, ideological, and political cycles. For instance, Bonjour (2011: 111) 
has argued that “the broadly shared assumption that it is an ‘Iron Law’ […] for ‘the public’ to be 
always, in all historical circumstances, in favour of restrictive immigration policies seems at the very 
least an oversimplification”. In the same vein, research by Acosta Arcarazo and Freier (2015) has 
identified the emergence of a ‘populist liberalism’ in Brazil and Argentina, where democratic political 
leaders have adopted welcoming discourses towards immigration since the mid-2000s as part of a 
populist strategy.  
In addition, researchers have refined the generalizing statement that liberal democracy and 
open immigration policy changes go together by highlighting a trend towards restrictive immigration 
policies in liberal-democracies across Europe and beyond, coined ‘illiberal liberalism’ or ‘repressive 
liberalism’ (Adamson, Triadafilopoulos, & Zolberg, 2011; Guild, Groenendijk, & Carrera, 2009; 
                                                                                                                                                                        
Cornelius, Martin and Hollifield (1994) or Castles (2004b), for instance, have defined the liberal paradox in an 
entirely different way (not discussed in this paper), namely as a ‘control gap’ that highlights the failure of states 
to effectively control immigration. 
Economic logic: Liberalism 
- Capitalism and globalization 
- Human rights constraints 
Openness towards 
immigration 
Political logic: Democracy 
- Electoral objectives 
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Joppke, 2007). They show that economic logic does not always trump political logic. Despite such 
limitations, the liberal paradox remains a highly valuable analytical tool for theorizing ideal-typical 
democratic immigration policy dynamics.  
3.2 The illiberal paradox   
This paper introduces the ‘illiberal paradox’16 as a complementary analytical tool to explain why 
autocracies can have more leeway than democracies to enact permissive immigration policies if it 
suits their economic, foreign policy, or domestic political priorities. The illiberal paradox hypothesis 
does not suggest that autocracies do enact more open policies than democracies. Indeed, many 
autocracies have drastically restricted immigration and migrants’ rights in the past and continue to do 
so. Instead, I seek to conceptualize the policy dynamics underlying the fact that autocracies can open 
their immigration regimes more easily than democracies if they wish to do so. I argue that while 
autocratic regimes are bound by the same global forces of liberalism as democracies, they are freer 
from the type of political logic found in democratic nation states, such as public opinion and 
bureaucratic dynamics.  
Autocracies face the same global forces of liberalism that drive immigration openness as 
democracies. This is not only true for globalization and trade liberalization, but also for the role of 
international liberal norms. In fact, in his initial formulation of the liberal paradox, Hollifield (1992: 
578) mentioned that “respect for human (and civil) rights can compel liberal states (and some that are 
not so liberal […]) to exercise caution in dealing with migrants.” In Morocco, for instance, 
international norm adherence and associated symbolic politics were key in driving open immigration 
reforms (Natter, 2018), confirming that “migration policies are dramaturgical acts aimed at national 
and world audiences” (FitzGerald & Cook-Martín, 2014: 21). 
At the same time, autocracies have more flexibility in enacting fundamental policy shifts 
compared to consolidated liberal democracies. Democracies are bound by existing legal frameworks, 
and enacting policy changes is subject to (lengthy) negotiations among different stakeholders and 
institutions. To change policy, elected officials almost always need to compromise to reach majority 
decisions or to make policies compatible with constitutional constraints. Thus, initial policy proposals 
are often watered down. Although autocracies also need to forge compromises and reconcile 
diverging interests, they have more leverage to enact rapid and fundamental policy shifts. Because of 
fewer national legal constraints, the range of policy options available at both ends of the spectrum — 
towards more openness or more restrictiveness — is larger than in democracies. Thus, if it fits their 
broader economic agenda, foreign policy priorities, and domestic political goals, autocracies can more 
easily enact open immigration policies because of their relative independence from potential popular 
anti-immigration sentiment and path-dependency dynamics within the bureaucracy. 17 Figure 11 
illustrates the dynamics captured by the illiberal paradox argument.  
                                                      
16 In this paper, the illiberal paradox refers to immigration policymaking. Other researchers are currently 
developing the idea of an illiberal paradox in relation to autocracies’ emigration policies (see Tsourapas 2018). 
17 Path dependence captures the fact that bureaucratic decisions of the past shape and limit future policy options: 
“Once a country or region has started down a track, the costs of reversal are very high. There will be other 
choice points, but the entrenchments of certain institutional arrangements obstruct an easy reversal of the initial 
choice” (Levi 1997: 28, see also: Pierson 2000). 
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Figure 11: The illiberal paradox hypothesis, schematized by the author  
 
However, the illiberal paradox has three main limitations. Together, these limitations 
highlight that increased leeway characterises autocratic policymaking — not an autocratic tendency to 
enact opening reforms: First, permissive changes towards immigration might not always be followed 
through in practice. Ironically, immigration policies can sometimes end up being open in discourse 
and restrictive in practice — the exact opposite of what the liberal paradox hypothesis suggests and 
leading to what one could call a ‘reverse discursive gap’. As we will see below, welcoming discourses 
on immigration might first and foremost fulfil a symbolic role towards a specific (and often 
international) audience. This is reminiscent of the ‘tough talk’ of politicians in democracies wishing to 
please their electorate with restrictive discourses and policy announcements, while not following them 
through in practice (de Haas et al., 2016).  
Second, while autocracies’ autonomy from legal constraints and democratic requests can 
favour more permissive immigration policy changes, it also increases their vulnerability to sudden, 
restrictive backlashes. Open immigration policy changes in autocratic regimes are often not enshrined 
in law but emerge from executive decisions, as the next section will show. In addition, the weak rule 
of law in many autocracies and the (at least partial) dependence of courts on the executive limit 
judicial actors’ ability to enforce migrants’ rights (WJP, 2018). As a consequence, immigration policy 
often fluctuates between progress and backlashes, depending on the state’s strategic interests. It is this 
ability to go forward and then backwards if domestic or international contexts shift that give 
autocracies more policy options on immigration.  
A third limitation is that immigration rights and integration rights do not automatically go 
hand in hand. An open entry policy does not imply the granting of socio-economic or other rights to 
the migrants in question. In fact, it might often be the opposite, particularly when the level of 
immigration is high. According to Ruhs (2013), high-income countries are faced with a trade-off 
between the numbers and rights of low-skilled workers. They can allow high immigrant numbers and 
restrict immigrants’ integration rights (such as in the Gulf countries) or limit immigrant numbers and 
offer immigrants full integration rights (such as in Scandinavian countries). Thus, it might be easier 
for many people around the world, in particularly lower-skilled workers, to migrate to autocracies 
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In summary, the illiberal paradox hypothesis suggests that autocratic regimes can enact 
permissive (and restrictive) immigration policies more easily than democracies — if this suits the 
economic, foreign policy, or domestic political priorities of the regime in place — because they are 
relatively independent from potential popular anti-immigration sentiments and bureaucratic path-
dependency dynamics. However, discursive openness towards immigration is not always 
implemented, leading to an immigration policy that might ultimately be liberal in discourse and 
restrictive in practice. In addition, liberal immigration policies can quickly be reversed and replaced 
by restriction due to  policymaking dynamics. Thus, the distinctive characteristic of autocratic 
policymaking is the increased leeway states have and the larger range of policy options available to 
them when devising immigration policies. 
3.3 Empirical illustrations 
Emerging empirical research on autocracies’ immigration policies offers preliminary evidence for this 
‘illiberal paradox’. The historical case studies on Latin America by FitzGerald and Cook-Martín 
(2014) provide examples of autocracies that abolished ethnic selection criteria, a permissive policy 
change, long before North American democracies did so. Writing about Mexico under the 
authoritarian regime of Porfirio Díaz (1876-1911) at the end of the 19th century, they conclude, “With 
a government that was liberal in form but a dictatorship in practice, [Foreign Minister] Vallarta could 
preach the virtues of racial equality without interference from the citizenry” (FitzGerald & Cook-
Martín, 2014: 226). Mexico’s open discourse on racial equality was possible only because authorities 
were independent from anti-immigrant and racist sentiments within the population. This independence 
allowed Mexico’s leaders to pursue broader diplomatic goals: “The impetus for change came from an 
elite foreign policy project to use anti-racism as a diplomatic tool to challenge the US and increase 
Mexico’s cultural influence in Latin America” (FitzGerald & Cook-Martín, 2014: 219).  
In a similar fashion, Brazilian authorities under the Old Republic18 (1889-1930) reversed the 
restrictive policy towards Asian immigration that had been introduced in June 1890 to meet economic 
and geopolitical interests: “Asian exclusion ended after just two years because only oligarchs sat at 
the policymaking table. The preferences of Brazilian workers were irrelevant to the political process 
at this point” (FitzGerald & Cook-Martín, 2014: 273). This example shows that autocratic 
policymaking facilitates radical policy reversals and decreases the weight of legal or institutional 
path-dependency dynamics, while simultaneously giving priority to strategic interests over domestic 
public opinion. However, the Brazilian case also highlights the gap between an open discourse (and 
law), and a restrictive implementation practice. The ethnically neutral policies on paper - including 
the major immigration reform in 1921 who set out who was not allowed entry - did not exclude ethnic 
selection in practice: “On its face, the [1921 Law of Undesirables] did not make ethnic distinctions, 
but its implementation by consular personnel effectively discriminated against individuals of 
unwanted origins, particularly in the case of blacks” (FitzGerald & Cook-Martín, 2014: 274).  
Over the past decades, authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and Africa have also enacted 
surprisingly open immigration policy changes based on their economic, foreign policy, or domestic 
political interests. Libya under the rule of Colonel Gaddafi is a prime example. Gaddafi’s shift from 
                                                      
18 Although formally a democracy, the power was concentrated in the hands of land owners, giving rise to that 
was called ‘Coronelismo’, an informal system in which colonels, local oligarchs, and governors were taking 
political decisions. 
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pan-Arabism to pan-Africanism in the early 1990s sought to position Libya as the new African leader. 
Accompanying this change in foreign policy was a decision to open up the country to labour 
immigration. As a result, several hundred thousand Sub-Saharan African labour migrants moved to 
Libya during the 1990s and 2000s to work in the booming rentier economy and oil industry (Paoletti, 
2011; Tsourapas, 2017). Yet, when geopolitical and economic circumstances changed in the early 
2000s, Gaddafi quickly reversed his policy approach and ordered massive expulsions of migrant 
workers. Given the weak rule of law in Libya, open immigration policies on paper did not offer any 
legal protections against this political backlash. Thus, the Libyan case forcefully shows the limits of 
autocratic immigration policy. Towards Arab labour migrants who arrived between the 1960s and 
1980s, as well as African labour migrants starting from the 1990s, a “politics of contradictions” 
(Paoletti, 2011: 221) prevailed. In other words, permissive and restrictive changes alternated and co-
occurred, depending on economic and geopolitical interests.  
Similarly, the Moroccan case illustrates how geopolitical and economic priorities can take 
precedent over domestic opinions and drive open policy reforms. In September 2013, King Mohamed 
VI announced a fundamental change in immigration policy. The country moved away from its 
restrictive approach — characterised by state violence towards (irregular) migrants, unlawful 
expulsions, and socio-economic exclusion — and towards a human-rights based policy built around a 
regularization campaign and the rolling out of integration measures (Alioua, Ferrié, & Reifeld, 2018; 
Cherti & Collyer, 2015; Natter, 2015, 2018; Norman, 2016). Morocco enacted these changes to 
enhance its image abroad, both in Africa, where Morocco sought to consolidate its position as an 
economic and political leader, and in Europe, where Morocco wanted to reinforce its image as a 
progressive, rights-respective, and liberal state (for an in-depth analysis of the drivers of this policy 
change, see: Natter, 2018). However, the opening towards immigration has been first and foremost 
discursive, used by the regime as a soft power tool; implementation has remained inconsistent. 
Research on the Gulf region (Fargues, 2013; Russell, 1989; Thiollet, 2016) demonstrates that 
domestic political priorities also drive autocratic openness in immigration policy. Indeed, the Gulf 
states’ large immigration programmes are shaped by domestic concerns around securing the benefits 
of oil revenue for the domestic population through importing a largely rights-less class of foreign 
workers. Gulf countries also show that open immigration reforms are particularly easy to adopt if 
entry rights are not automatically coupled with socio-economic rights. As Thiollet has shown in her 
empirical work on Saudi Arabia, immigration is regulated through a “quasi-open border policy” 
(Thiollet, 2016: 11). However, this openness does not include access to permanent residency or 
naturalization, leaving migrants in a fragile legal position and vulnerable to abuse. Quantitative 
studies on what drives immigration policies in ‘wealthy autocracies’ confirm this disconnection 
between immigration and integration rights. In other words, these countries have more flexibility to 
allow migrants in precisely because they can limit their access to basic rights (Breunig et al., 2012; 
Mirilovic, 2010; Ruhs, 2013; Shin, 2017). 
This numbers vs. rights trade-off (Ruhs, 2013) is not observable in the refugee policies of 
African countries such as Uganda, Guinea, or Zambia. Since the mid-2000s, Uganda’s autocratic 
government has adopted a vocally open reception and integration policy for refugees despite 
increasing numbers. With 1.2 million refugees, Uganda is now the largest refugee-hosting country in 
Africa. Nonetheless, refugees are granted freedom of movement and work, access to education and 
healthcare, as well as a plot of land to cultivate (Watera et al., 2017). While the drivers behind this 
open refugee policy have been under-researched from an academic viewpoint, journalistic coverage 
points to how refugee policy improves the image of Uganda’s autocratic regime, as well as how it 
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helps attract development aid and economic investments: “Uganda's refugee policy isn't purely 
altruistic. For the underdeveloped northwestern part of the country, the international aid pouring in is 
extremely helpful. […] The total has quickly swelled to several million euros - of which far too much 
ends up in the private bank accounts of corrupt elites”.19 
Similarly, Guinea has pursued an open refugee policy since 2003 despite related and growing 
security concerns, partly for leverage in foreign policy relations, but also “because the nature of the 
Guinean state […] gives the President a monopoly on power and the ability to pursue policies 
objectives in the absence of any meaningful political opposition” (Milner, 2006: 210-211). Likewise, 
Zambia has adopted refugee-friendly policies since 2014, notwithstanding the protracted situation of 
former refugees from Angola and Rwanda and growing numbers of refugees from neighboring 
Democratic Republic of Congo. This change in policy occurred simultaneously with the authoritarian 
shift in Zambia. The president of Zambia has been able to disregard popular calls for restriction and 
contestation from within the bureaucratic apparatus. Indeed, he has capitalised on international 
support for his refugee policy — support that lessens criticism of human rights violations and 
autocratic governance.20 
In Asia, immigration politics since the 1990s have been closely tied to countries’ economic 
development trajectories, given that economic growth and industrialization has been accompanied by 
their - at least partial - transition from emigration to immigration countries. Kazakhstan offers a 
typical example of the ‘illiberal paradox’ hypothesis: Ruled by the authoritarian regime of President 
Nazarbayev since 1991, the Central Asian country stands out for its liberalizing immigration policy 
changes. A one-time regularisation in 2006 granted legal status to around 164,000 migrants, mainly 
from Uzbekistan but also from  Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan (Laruelle, 2008). And policy 
changes in 2014 and 2017 have facilitated foreigners’ access to work permits and liberalized the 
country’s travel visa regime.21 With GDP growth averaging 8 percent over the 2000s, international 
immigration has been a declared goal not only to counteract demographic decline but also as part and 
parcel of the regime’s economic development agenda until 2050.  
In contrast, developments in Thailand, a major regional destination for labor migrants from 
Cambodia, Myanmar or Laos, are exemplary for how immigration policy can fluctuated back and 
forth between openings and restrictions as a result of recurrent political turmoil, including military 
                                                      
19 http://www.spiegel.de/international/tomorrow/uganda-is-the-most-refugee-friendly-country-in-the-world-a-
1167294.html; see also: http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2016/07/05/l-ouganda-est-il-l-ami-des-
refugies_4964193_3212.html, both retrieved on 16 June 2018. 
20 “The driving force for these recent changes appears to be coming not from the international or local level, but 
rather from the state and specifically, two personalities: the president, Edgar Lungu, and the newly appointed 
commissioner for refugees, Abdon Mawere. The president personally intervened to develop the new Refugee 
Act, and he ignored ministerial departments’ demands that former refugees from Rwanda be repatriated. […] 
Lungu is free to implement programs and initiatives based on self-interest and ideological commitments without 
being overly concerned about opposition parties or losing a re-election. […] Yet Zambia’s commitment to 
sheltering and integrating large numbers of refugees also has international benefits. As seen with Uganda, 
receiving large numbers of refugees has the potential to make the international community turn a blind eye to 
declines in democratic principles in the country.” 
(https://www.newsdeeply.com/refugees/community/2018/06/12/whats-behind-zambias-growing-welcome-to-
refugees, retrieved on 12 June 2018). 
21 See for instance: https://jamestown.org/program/kazakhstan-adopts-new-policy-toward-foreign-migrants/ or 
https://www.relocatemagazine.com/immigration-kazakhstan-new-years-immigration-reforms-bring-mixed-
impact, both retrieved on 7 October 2018. 
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coups in 2006 and 2014. While the Thai government has administered regularisation campaigns in 
1992 and in 2009, granting (quasi) legal status to nearly 1,3 million workers from neighbouring 
countries (Pracha, 2010), in 2014 and 2017 massive crack-downs on irregular migrants took place and 
higher penalties for irregular stay and work were introduced. This policy volatility has not only 
created confusion among migrants, triggering the exodus of a substantial part of the irregular migrant 
population in a short time-span, but has also increased room for corruption and arbitrary policy 
implementation by bureaucrats (Bylander & Reid, 2017). Overall, the Thai case shows that it is the 
ability to rapidly switch from liberalization to restriction and back depending on the state’s strategic 
interests that give autocracies more policy options on immigration. 
4 Concluding	thoughts:	Where	to	go	next?	 	 	
Open immigration policy changes are not an exclusive feature of democracies, and restrictive 
immigration policy changes are not an exclusive feature of autocracies. The evidence presented in this 
article shows that, contrary to widespread beliefs, there is no regime-specific pattern when it comes to 
the substance — openness or restrictiveness — of immigration policy changes per se. First and 
foremost, immigration policy changes are shaped by states’ broader socio-economic and geopolitical 
interests. Yet, political regimes shape the dynamics underlying immigration policy changes in terms 
of the domestic and international influences states must reconcile. Because of political considerations, 
democracies have less leeway in devising their immigration policies. Autocracies usually have a 
wider range of policy options at their disposal to allow (or restrict) immigration, largely because they 
do not have to always align with public opinion and do not face democracy-style bureaucratic 
obstacles.  
To make sense of open immigration reforms in autocracies and to enlarge the theoretical 
toolbox available to scholars analysing immigration policymaking dynamics worldwide, I have 
introduced the ‘illiberal paradox’ hypothesis as a complement to the ‘liberal paradox’ (Hollifield 
1992). I argue that autocratic regimes, while bound by the same international forces of economic and 
rights-based liberalism as democracies, are more autonomous from nation-state logics and potential 
popular anti-immigration sentiments. Autocratic regimes therefore can enact liberal immigration 
policies more easily than democracies, but only if doing so suits the economic, foreign policy, or 
domestic political priorities of the regime in place.  
To conclude, I would like to suggest that the ideal-typical dynamics captured by the liberal 
and illiberal paradox are not exclusively applicable to their ‘natural contexts’, i.e., the liberal paradox 
as a dynamic of democracies and the illiberal paradox as a dynamic of autocracies. In fact, when 
looking at political practices across a variety of political regimes, the liberal and illiberal frameworks 
may possibly apply to policymaking dynamics across the entire democracy-autocracy spectrum. This 
approach provides grounds for a more global theorization of immigration policymaking beyond the 
democracy/autocracy divide. 
4.1 Integrating analyses of political practices and 
ideal-typical regime dynamics  
The liberal and illiberal paradox offer valuable analytical frames to conceptualise some of the ideal-
typical dynamics democracies and autocracies face when elaborating their immigration policies. 
However, remaining at the level of binary regime typologies is ultimately of limited analytical value. 
One way forward is to combine (1) existing conceptual work that identifies ideal types of democratic 
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or autocratic immigration policymaking with (2) empirical analyses exploring the nuances of real-life 
political practices. Indeed, looking at political practices would allow researchers to detect similarities 
in policymaking within and across political regimes, for instance by identifying autocratic or 
authoritarian practices within formally democratic systems and democratic practices within formally 
autocratic systems (Glasius, 2018b). 
On the one hand, not all decisions in formal democracies are subject to popular control or 
legislative approval. History and recent politics abound with examples of policy practices within 
democracies that have an autocratic element, such as executive orders or ministerial decrees that 
bypass discussions in parliament, among parties, or with the public. These autocratic policy tools offer 
opportunities to enact open immigration reforms precisely because of the lack of democratic 
oversight. Ultimately, the illiberal paradox hypothesis posits that authoritarian practices facilitate open 
immigration reforms if it suits the regime’s broader priorities, be it in a democracy or autocracy.  
Writing on democratic Canada, FitzGerald and Cook-Martín (2014) showed how the removal 
of ethnic selection criteria in Canada’s immigration policy became possible only through the use of 
legal channels safe from public debate and popular accountability: “The cabinet ended ethnic 
selection in 1962 and 1967 through orders-in-council to avoid a full parliamentary debate that would 
lend voice to domestic actors with a more restrictionist agenda” (FitzGerald & Cook-Martín, 2014: 
183-4). Decisions on travel visa requirements are also classic examples of executive decision making 
that lacks public control and can therefore respond more easily to economic or diplomatic priorities: 
“As visas can generally be imposed through directives, executive decrees or other administrative 
measures, and thus do not require cumbersome legal changes, they are seen as a quick, discrete and 
effective migration policy instrument” (de Haas et al., 2018: 32).  
Furthermore, despite the politicization of immigration across Europe, large parts of 
immigration policy — such as labour shortage lists or bilateral agreements — are negotiated behind 
closed doors and through typical ‘client politics’ (Freeman, 1995). The agreement between the Dutch 
government and the Asian catering industry for the employment of Asian cooks (so-called wok-
agreement) is a case in point.22 Albeit sector-specific and limited in terms of volume, this agreement 
is exemplary for the ways in which — despite a though rhetoric on immigration — legal mechanisms 
are opened to allow the recruitment of migrant workers. 
On the other hand, autocratic regimes are not entirely immune to public pressures, as they 
have to secure their legitimacy at home. For instance, to prevent potential social unrest by the 
country’s unemployed youth, the Saudi government in 2011 not only increased the distribution of oil 
rent to the population, but also launched a series of restrictive changes towards immigrants, including 
highly symbolic measures such as mass deportations. As Thiollet (2015: 132) writes, “The stated 
objectives of reducing youth and female unemployment, and of increasing the competitiveness of 
Saudis compared to immigrant workers are in fact combined with the short term objective of buying 
social peace, notably among the popular classes and the qualified youth”. Given Saudi Arabia’s 
                                                      
22 Signed for the first time in 2014 and prolonged in 2016, this agreement between the Dutch government and 
the Asian catering industry allows Asian restaurants (Chinese, Indonesian, Japanese, Indian, Korean, Malaysian, 
Thai, Tibetan and Vietnamese restaurants) to recruit cooks from Asia up to a quota limit - 1,800 cooks in 2017 
and 1,400 in 2018. See: https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2016/09/23/kabinet-verlengt-wokakkoord-met-drie-jaar-
a1523040, retrieved 7 October 2018. 
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attempts to move towards a post-oil economy, the question of immigrant labour is likely to become 
more acute even in the strongly controlled public sphere. Similar dynamics in which autocratic 
political leaders face increased popular opposition to their large-scale immigration programmes can 
also be found in Kuwait or Singapore.23  
The ‘competitive authoritarian’ regime of Rafael Correa in Ecuador since 2006 provides 
another interesting illustration. In June 2008, Ecuador revamped its visa policy by removing visa 
restrictions for all nationalities in the world: “The official goals of this policy were twofold: one was 
to encourage tourism, the other to implement the principle of universal citizenship” (Acosta Arcarazo 
& Freier, 2015: 21). Yet, only a few months later, the open policy was subject to a partial reversal 
when visa restrictions were reintroduced for nationalities from where immigration was ‘not desired’.24 
The Ecuadorian example shows both the enhanced capacity of autocratic governments to open 
immigration channels, as well as the ultimate fragility of permissive immigration reforms in the face 
of large-scale popular opposition. According to Freier (2013: 16), “Correa faced internal political 
pressure from within his administration, from the political opposition and the media to revoke 
universal visa freedom”. Thus, despite the autocratic nature of the Correa regime, immigration 
policymaking can be influenced by the need to safeguard domestic political legitimacy and popular 
support.  
These examples of democratic dynamics within autocracies and autocratic dynamics within 
democracies suggest that, when looking at political practices, there might in fact be more similarities 
in immigration policymaking than expected from a pure political regime perspective. In Brazil, for 
example, regardless of the formal political system in place, political leaders have used discretionary 
administrative regulations to avoid political attention and legislative procedures: “Brazilian officials 
have historically preferred to manage migration with administrative regulations. […] Military rulers, 
like their democratically elected predecessors, preferred to maximise discretion in matters of 
immigration” (FitzGerald & Cook-Martín, 2014: 290, 294). More generally, authoritarian policy 
practices substantially increase the leeway of both democratic and autocratic leaders for opening (or 
restricting) immigration.  
4.2 Towards a global theorization of immigration 
policymaking 
Within a perspective combining ideal-typical, regime-specific immigration policy dynamics and real-
life political practices, both the liberal and the illiberal paradox may be useful in explaining certain 
immigration policymaking across various political regimes. Indeed, countries along the democracy-
autocracy spectrum must consider economic lobbies, public opinion, and geopolitical interests in their 
decision making. Autocracies need to secure their domestic legitimacy and are therefore not entirely 
                                                      
23 In Singapore, large-scale immigration programs of both high- and low-skilled workers have been central to 
the country’s economic success. However, popular opposition to the country’s liberal immigration policies - in 
particular for high-skilled workers - forced the government in place to tighten some of its policy measures in 
2011 (Yeoh & Lin, 2012). In Kuwait, anti-immigration sentiments are gaining ground and the population’s fears 
related to temporary foreign workers that represent 70 percent of the country’s population start to be politically 
instrumentalized. See: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-04-12/arab-populists-also-blame-
foreigners-as-gulf-austerity-sets-in, retrieved 6 July 2018. 
24 “Only six months after its introduction, visa requirements were reintroduced for Chinese citizens, and 18 
months later for citizens of Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, and 
Somalia” (Acosta Arcarazo and Freier 2015: 25). 
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immune to popular demands, while democracies have policy instruments at their disposal that allow 
them to take decisions behind closed doors or free from parliamentary oversight or popular scrutiny.  
I therefore suggest that there is no need to artificially separate theories on the drivers of 
immigration policy under democratic or autocratic contexts. The added value of conceptualizations 
such as the liberal and illiberal paradox is not to provide predictive models of immigration policy 
change across time and space, but rather to identify dynamics at play under specific constellations of 
factors. The liberal and illiberal paradox are theoretical frameworks that come alive only in 
conjunction with empirical observations, a key to read developments, variations, and commonalities 
across countries; they provide a starting point for further reflection and research. To achieve a more 
realistic assessment of immigration policy and its institutional or systemic drivers, scholars first need 
to open up the democratic and autocratic regime boxes and confront their associated assumptions 
about immigration policy substance and dynamics with policy practices on the ground. Ultimately, an 
effective and comprehensive analytical framework should capture the political practices in both 
democratic and autocratic contexts that lead to permissive or restrictive immigration policy reforms.  
Researchers have already started to move towards more global theorizations of immigration 
policymaking (Acosta Arcarazo & Freier, 2015; Adamson & Tsourapas, forthcoming; FitzGerald & 
Cook-Martín, 2014; Garcés-Mascareñas, 2012, 2018; Natter, 2014, 2018; Norman, 2018). These 
analyses provide a starting point for theorizing immigration policy dynamics across political regimes, 
identifying convergences or divergences across and within political systems, and starting a dialogue 
across the often still distinct literatures on immigration policymaking in ‘Western liberal democracies’ 
and elsewhere. Without questioning the importance of networks and other processes which help 
sustaining migration corridors despite increased policy restrictions, the evidence presented in this 
paper confirms the crucial role of both origin and destination states in shaping migration. 	
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